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Chapter pages in book: (p. 51 - 56)between the responsibilities of the national and the provincial
(state) governments has tended over the decades to nullify the
theory of separation.
The tenacity with which the provincial governments pressed
their claims is, however, wholly understandable. If in every crisis
the area of federal taxes expanded, with no reversion afterwards
to the former position, the provinces would be left with few
assured sources of revenue. The semblance of fiscal independence
would be lost to them. Federal control of certain minor taxes was
not necessary in order to implement a program of high employ-
ment. The yield of these taxes to the Dominion was, moreover,
relatively small. The provincial governments argued, therefore,
that cession would be a small price to pay for agreement on the
larger program.
CONCLUSION
During World War lithe fiscal program of the federal govern-
ment expanded enormously compared with that of the provincial
and local governments. Federal tax collections in 1943 were five
times as great as in 1937, while provincial and local collections
remained nearly stationary (Table 6). The types of tax employed
by the federal government also underwent a remarkable change.
Whereas in 1938-39, 71.0 percent of federal revenue came from
indirect taxes, by 1944-45 the figure had shrunk to 34.4 percent.
Income taxation supplied 63.7 percent in the latter, and only
26.3 percent in the former year (Table 7).
TABLE 6
Tax Collections in Canada, 1937 and 1943
1937 1943 1937 1943 7937 1943
(millionsof dollars) (percentages) ($ per capita)
Federal 449 2,437 4-8 84- 41.00206.40
Provincial.... 159 173 21 6 17.50 14.70
Local 266 293 31 10 26.40 24.90
Total 874 2,903 100 100 84.90 246.00
Conference, Comparative Statislics of Pith/ic Finance.
These figures alone do not indicate the full impact of the
financial program of the federal government. By virtue of war-
time powers, it had been able to centralize and integrate fiscal
decisions, and the effectiveness of this program quickened the
51thought that something of the sort should be done after the war.
In 1945 the federal government announced "unequivocally its
adoption of a high and stable level of employment and income,
and thereby higher standards of living, as a major aim of Gov-
ernment policy".75 But federal action would be more effective
if important instruments of fiscal power, which in peacetime were
in the hands of the provincial governments, could be placed under
federal control, and i,f a plan could be worked out for coordinat-
ing provincial decisions concerning expenditures, revenues, and
debt with those of the federal government. In essence, the aim
of the federal government is to increase the flexibility of its
action in pursuit of a policy of high employment. Assumption of
responsibility for such a policy carries with it responsibility for
establishing machinery that will translate decisions into action
with reasonable promptness.
TABLE 7
Distribution of Federal Taxation
(in percentages)
Direct Taxes 1938-39 1944-15
Personalincome 9.7 32.4
Corporation income 16.6 31.3





Sales, excises, and miscellaneous 48.2 29.6
Subtotals 71.0 34.4
Totals 100.0 100.0
Conference, Statistics of Public Finance; House of Commons Debates,
Daily Edition, June 27, 1946.
The federal program as originally presented had three major
parts: social security, public investment, tax and subsidy revision.
As a top estimate the added governmental cost of the full pro-
gram may be reckoned at $600 million for the federal govern-
ment and $200-300 million for the provincial governments.76
75Enzploymen: and Income (King's Printer, Ottawa, 1945), p. 23.
76Thesefigures were suggested by Mr. Bracken, the leader of the opposition in the
House of Commons (House of Commons Debates, Daily Edition, July 18,1946,
pp. 3660-1). This reckoning is speculative since at no stage of the negotiations were
figures given on the amount of the proposed grants for public investment or on the
cost of the expanded program of unemployment insurance.
52The level of federal expenditure for a normal postwar year may
be $1,800 million and that of the provincial governments $360
million. In such case full implementation of the program might
increase federal expenditure one-third and provincial one-half.
The added cost would constitute 7.3 percent of a gross national
product of $11 billion.
The scope of the program was, however, much reduced after
the failure of the Conference. Expansion of federal responsi-
bilityforthe unemployed employables,introductionof an
over-all plan of social security and of the coordination of public
investment were to be "held in abeyance". The federal govern-
ment, under the limited agreements made in 1947, will for five
years pay seven of the nine provinces annually about $87.9
million, compared with $39.4 million paid to them in 1945, as a
"rental" for their rights in the fields of income and corporation
taxes and succession duties.
The significance even of partial agreement should not be
measured chiefly in terms of the direct effect on governmental
revenue and expenditure. Federal control of the taxes specified,
even within a limited area, is an important accretion to federal
power. Within this area,it should minimize, even eliminate,
multiple taxation, and it may permit effective increase or decrease
of rates, exemptions, and collections according toa counter-
cyclical plan. Here is an instance in which implementation of
countercyclical policy in Canada is much more advanced than in
the United
Federalcontrol of income and death taxes in the United States has often been
discussed, although attention has centered on issues of equity and long-run economic
benefits rather than of countercyclicalfiscalpolicy. And reformers usually stop
short of the recommendation of complete centralization and propose instead state
supplements to a uniform federal personal income tax, state adoption of the corporate
net income tax with a uniform formula for apportioning interstate income, and
extension of the crediting device with respect to death taxes. This failure to discuss
complete centralization and its merits in terms of fiscal policy is surprising, the
more so because recent emphasis has been on the superiority of variation in taxes
as compared with variation in governmental spending for countercyclical purposes.
If tax variation is superior as an instrument of countercyclical policy, then cen-
tralization of the income tax and death duties would put great powers in the hands
of the policy makers. It may be, of course, that the reluctance of writers in the
United States to discuss complete centralization stems from a feeling that the
proposal is not practical politics (although the hypothetical nature of other of their
speculations and recommendations makes this explanation implausible).
53In implementing countercyclical policy Canada has other ad-
vantages. Its governmental system—federal as well as provincial
—merges legislative and executive functions, thereby making it
the more likely that policy can be both promptly determined and
enacted into law. In the United States a program of compensa-
tory spending would, in the first instance, be a matter for execu-
tivedetermination.Congressional consideration would come
Eater, and in this process delay and modification are inevitable.
In Canada such a program, after formulation by the Cabinet,
usually could be carried through the parliament speedily and
without major alteration. And the legislation is much less likely
than in the United States to tie the hands of the executive by
strict rules. Proposals of writers on fiscal policy that Congress
(Parliament) give the executive the power to make temporary
revisions in tax rates and spending are much more "practical"
politics in Canada than in the United States.78
In Canada, moreover, the mechanism for intergovernmental
determination and coordination of policy is better developed. In
recent years Dominion-provincial conferences have met fre-
quently. It would seem that regular meetings could be scheduled
and that, through them, an opportunity for reaching decisions at
the highest level would be provided. Sometimes, to be sure, the
conferences have appeared to be divisive in their results because
provincial premiers have used them as a sounding-board from
which to air grievances. This sort of behavior is inevitable. And
the proper conclusion to draw is simply that an outlet for griev-
ances is desirable. Australia provides an instructive model. The
so-called Premier's Conference meets frequently to consider a
wide range of problems and to lay down broad principles of
national policy even on matters that are constitutionally the re-
sponsibility of the states. A similar development seems much
more likely in Canada than in the United States.
Yet the remarkable fact is that at lower official levels federal-
state consultation in the United States has advanced further and
been more successful than in Canada. In the United States,
officials, both federal and state, concerned with the administra-
78R.A. Musgrave and others, Public Finance and Full Employment (Postwar
Economic Studies, 3, Boardof Governorsof the Federal Reserve System, 1945),
pp. 17 and 43.
54tion of legislation on social security, public health, public roads,
etc., meet regularly. The reason for their effective functioning
appears to be the greater utilization of the conditional grant.
So far these meetings have been devoted to administrative issues
rather than to the formulation of policy. And no matter how
important the former may be, they have only a secondary useful-
nessfor implementing a national economic policy by fiscal
measures.
This difference between Canada and the United States indi-
cates, however, one weakness in the Canadian plan—a weakness
that stems from the lag of Canada in the development of joint
administration. In Canada, policy makers (including the members
of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations)
have been predisposed toward separating governmental func-
tions. They have favored a precise division of responsibility with
unified administration under a single authority. If responsibility
could be divided, no other approach would have to be consid-
ered. But attempts at precise division face the danger that devel-
opment may be pushed along two inconsistent lines. One, which
leads tocentralization, transfers important functions to the
federal government; the other, which leads to decentralization,
leaves important functions completely in the hands of the pro-
vincial governments, and bolsters their financial position by un-
conditional subsidies.
The fact is that, in a federal nation, some uniformity of gov-
ernmental action is desirable concerning matters about which
the constitutional right of each government to act separately is
not at issue. One provincial government, for example, is inter-
ested in what another does with respect to forest fire protection,
labor legislation, etc., and the federal government is interested
in the actions of both. Major responsibility for many important
governmental functions must be left in provincial hands, and
the problem is how to attain a reasonable uniformity with a
minimum of delay, compromise, and indecision. The best prac-
tical answer is often joint administration. Beyond a doubt this
sometimes makes the reaching of decisions a protracted process.
But it is illusory and defeatist to seek short cuts through cen-
tralization or separatism.
The relevance of these generalizations to th.e success of certain
55features of the Canadian program can be illustrated by an ex-
ample. In the United States by all odds the most important
single outlet for a program of compensatory spending would
be public roads. Federal aid to highways has been in existence
for thirty years, and the Public Roads Administration has
evolved an elaborate and effective mechanism for planning and
execution. In Canada nothing of the sort exists. The federal
government has, to be sure, made up its mind to use federal
aid to stimulate and retard public investment. But translation
of this into practice will be quite another matter because the
machinery for federal-provincial cooperation is rudimentary.
The federal government in Canada has been impressed by the
generalization of fiscal planners that governmental inaction is
more dangerous than action and that nowadays there is an im-
perious necessity to do something.It believes that its actions
have a great and distinctive influence upon individual and bus-
iness incentives, that it can make investment and saving more
or less attractive, and that it can affect the propensity to con-
sume and the desire to work. The whole approach is, however,
intended to assist the system of private enterprise to function
more efficiently. Except in depression, government itself is not
to expand its provision of jobs; rather is it to encourage business
to provide jobs. While committed to compensatory policies
against inflation and deflation, the Canadian government will
also pursue basic policies designed to minimize the extent of
either. A remarkable feature of the official pronouncements is
their confident tone. They manifest no political escapism to
justify doing nothing. Certain things are to be done, and no
doubt is expressed that they are the right things.79
T9The academic person surrounds his generalizations with qualifications both be-
cause of a desire to present a complete picture and to forestall future criticism.
Once a policy has been adopted, the responsible government official neglects the
qualifications because his job isto carry through the policy and because he is
aware that no criticism will be diverted by the prior expression of doubts.
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